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Abstract 
State-owned enterprises are often thought to represent a distortion in the labor market, but the implied 
efficiency losses have not been carefully estimated. This paper presents the first rigorous 
quantification of the aggregate productivity effects of privatization of public sector enterprises. We 
study historical episodes of privatization of public sector firms in India over the period 1991-2005, 
and find evidence of reallocation of labor away from the public sector following privatization. In turn, 
this reallocation appears to result in a substantial improvement in aggregate productivity and output. 
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, one of the most under-appreciated changes in the structure of modern
economies has been thewinding down of state-ownership andmanagement of produc-
tive assets. Encouraged by the successful privatization experiments of the Thatcherite
government in Britain, a number of countries embarked on a process of divestiture of
state-owned enterprises, or SOEs (see Megginson 2005 for a historical account). In-
deed, Djankov and Murrell (2002) refer to privatization as the "pre-eminent policy re-
form of the 1990s". Notwithstanding the steady decline in state ownership in most
countries over the last few decades, the issue of privatization is receiving renewed at-
tention due to a number of distinct factors. A first factor is the incipient divestiture
of SOEs in China, the significance of which is highlighted by the fact that two of the
three largest IPOs in history have occurred in the last ten years, and represented initial
share offerings in two of the "Big Four" Chinese state-owned banks.1 A second factor
generating interest in state-ownership is the financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in a
wave of partial nationalizations of banks and financial institutions around the world.
Third, a sustained fall in global oil prices has led to pressures to privatize state-owned
petroleum corporations, most notably in the Middle East.
The empirical literature on the effects of privatization has been dominated by clas-
sic questions arising in the field of finance, including the relationship between firm
performance and ownership, and the structure and investment performance of share
offerings in SOEs (Megginson and Netter 2001 and Birdsall and Nellis 2003 provide
thorough surveys of this literature; see Megginson 2017 for a survey of the more re-
cent literature). In contrast, a broader set of economic questions concerning the impact
of state-ownership (and, by implication, privatization) on the rest of the economy, in
1The Agricultural Bank of China Ltd and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China went public
in 2010 and 2007 respectively, raising more than $19 billion each. As Megginson (2005) notes, the largest
security offering in history was also associated with an SOE (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone in 1988).
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terms of general equilibrium implications and labor market spillovers, has received
descriptive attention (e.g. Haltiwanger and Singh 1998, Rama 1999), but virtually no
rigorous evaluation.
In particular, the argument that state-ownership of firms distorts the allocation of
resources (especially labor and credit) in the economy, and thereby gives rise to ag-
gregate inefficiencies (over and above the effect of state-ownership on the efficiency of
the SOE), is frequently made on theoretical grounds, and is supported by a number of
stylized facts about the public sector: First, the public sector has historically accounted
for a substantial percentage of employment in a number of economies; it is also sig-
nificantly less efficient than the private sector (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2008) estimate
that marginal factor productivity in SOEs in China is at least 40% lower than that of
private enterprises; see also Dollar andWei 2007); third, the public sector has tended to
compensate workers at a rate that is not aligned with their productivity (Rama 1999), a
factor that tends to "lock-in" the inefficient allocation of labor. There is ample evidence,
therefore, suggesting that SOEs may be a significant source of distortion in local factor
markets.
Focusing on the labor market distortions associatedwith state-ownership, the ques-
tion of whether privatization will necessarily correct these distortions cannot be unam-
biguously answered, with the final outcome depending on a number of complemen-
tary factors such as the structure of the retrenchment process and the nature of labor
regulations. To start with, the stringency of the labor regime (with respect to, for ex-
ample, employment protection) will constrain the ability and/or willingness of the ex-
isting private sector to absorb workers shed by the SOE; second, the skill-composition
of the retrenched workers will also affect their ability to find new employment. The
available evidence indicates that retrenched workers are usually successful at obtain-
ing employment relatively soon afterwards (see the country studies summarized in
Mckenzie and Mookherjee 2003, and the case studies in Haltiwanger and Singh 1998),
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which may partially reflect the findings of Chong, Guillen and Lopez-Silanes (2011),
who show that retrenchment programs associated with privatization have typically
had the effect of inducing the most productive workers to leave. These findings there-
fore beg the question of whether and to what extent worker reallocation following
privatization actually increases the economy’s efficiency in the aggregate.
By nature, such general equilibrium effects are difficult to estimate, however, be-
cause it is rarely the case that one can construct credible counterfactuals or control
groups. We tackle this question by utilizing the natural experiments arising from his-
torical privatization episodes in India, a country where the state continues to control
a significant share of the formal manufacturing sector. Starting in the early 1990s, In-
dia initiated a process of disinvestment in public sector enterprises. We focus on the
period 1991-2005 during which a number of SOEs were privatized. Our hypothesis
is that privatization of SOEs may bring to bear market pressures that release labor to
more productive sectors of the economy, and as a result, may improve overall produc-
tivity in the economy.
We argue that this is a nearly ideal setting for analyzing such effects, because the
staggered implementation of privatization interacts with the local nature of labor mar-
kets to provide a credible identification strategy. We analyze the reallocational effects
of the Indian privatization reforms by examining how the privatization of a factory in a
particular district affects the allocation of resources (particularly labor), and hence ag-
gregate output and productivity, in that district. We employ a difference-in-differences
approach, examining how these outcomes changed in districts that had an SOE that
was privatized, relative to comparable districts that did not. This strategy takes ad-
vantage of significant spatio-temporal variation in district-level "exposure" to privati-
zation.
The results indicate that, on average, exposure to a privatization event increases
aggregate output and productivity in the local economy by about 7%. We also find
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a significant reallocation of labor from the public to the private sector; as we would
expect, the reallocational gains are greater in industries that are more likely to provide
close employment substitutes to jobs in the privatized firms. There is also evidence that
the extent of labor reallocation is stronger in states with more flexible labor laws. In
line with the predictions of a simple model, we also find that the increase in aggregate
output is greater in labor markets characterized by a larger pre-reform productivity
gap between the public and private firms. Finally, a simple decomposition suggests
that the entire increase in aggregate productivity can be attributed to input reallocation
between the public and private sectors. These results provide a rigorous confirmation
of the hypothesis that SOEs represent a source of distortion in the labor market, while
also providing the first quantification of the associated efficiency losses.
Our study makes two important contributions. First, we fill a gap in the debate re-
garding the social desirability of privatization by providing estimates of the aggregate
efficiency losses from state-ownership. A notable aspect of the results is that in most
cases of privatization in our data the state continued to retain majority ownership of
the SOE, implying that even partial privatization is associated with significant ratio-
nalization and reallocational gains. Our results on successful labor reallocation are
especially significant, given that the prospect of employment losses is a key issue sur-
rounding privatizations in most countries, including India, where the phenomenon of
"jobless growth" in themanufacturing sector has particularly intensified the opposition
to privatization.
Our study also makes a contribution to a literature that has focused on explain-
ing the persistent cross-country differences in productivity by examining factors that
distort the allocation of resources within the economy. In an influential study, Hsieh
and Klenow (2008) demonstrate that the manufacturing sector in countries like India
and China is typified by stark and persistent “mis-allocations”, in which productive
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resources such as labour and capital are locked into highly inefficient configurations.2
From a theoretical standpoint, the underlying constraints may be usefully categorized
as “frictions”, but from a policy perspective it is critical to identify the particular insti-
tutional features that have given rise to these frictions. While attention has frequently
centered on labor regulations,3 our findings underscore the point that states’ interfer-
ence in labor markets sometimes takes more direct forms, with significant implications
for the allocation of resources in the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a description of public sector
reforms in India; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 explains the empirical strategy
and presents the results; Section 5 concludes.
2 Privatization of public sector enterprises in India, 1991-
2005
India is one of a number of countries that embarked on privatization of state firms
during the 1990s (other examples include Indonesia, Bangladesh, and a number of
transition economies in Eastern Europe). In India, the process was initiated as part of
a broader set of economic reforms in response to a severe balance-of-payments crisis
in 1991. Prior to the crisis, state-owned firms had been a long-standing and significant
part of the economic landscape - as in other countries that had adopted the socialist
model, state ownership in India was an important means of exercising control over
the economy, and for fulfilling the 5-year economic plans. We focus on public sector
enterprises operated by the national government, also referred to as Central Public Sec-
2A similar observation has beenmade in the context of the agricultural sector in developing countries
(Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2014).
3There is now ample evidence of the adverse effects of such policies (e.g. see the chapters in the
volume by Heckman and Pages 2004). Indeed, in their study of a number of developing countries in
Africa, Asia and Latin America, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) find that employment flexibility consis-
tently emerges as a key facilitator of structural transformation.
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tor Enterprises. By 1991, CPSEs constituted nearly 85% of public sector capital assets.
Over time, however, mounting losses in these firms became a drain on the exchequer
and heightened the case for reform.
Kapur and Ramamurti (2002) and Makhija (2006) provide illuminating discussions
of the process of privatization in India (see also Ghuman 1999). In line with most other
countries that have undertaken privatization, privatization in India was a process that
started as a result of an initial impetus (the crisis of 1991) but thereafter escalated only
gradually. The term "privatization" itself was largely avoided; instead, the reform was
described as a program of divestment. In the early phases of the reform, disinvestment
was restricted to sales of up to 20% of the shares of each privatized company; this
gradually increased to sales of up to 49% of ownership share (just short of relinquishing
state control over the enterprises), and then to 74% of ownership share. It was only in
the early 2000s that outright sale of SOEs occurred.
Table 1 lists the public sector companies that were subjected to disinvestment dur-
ing the period under study, 1991-2005 (we focus only on manufacturing sector firms).
Because CPSEs were all large multi-plant firms, the actual number of districts which
experienced a "privatization event" is much larger than the number of firms privatized,
as we discuss later. The majority of these privatizations took the form of share-issue
privatization (SIP); a smaller number of firms were sold to single entities (so-called
"asset sales"). Alongside the gradual increase in the degree of privatization, there was
also a relaxation of strictures concerning the sectors that were open for privatization as
well as a relaxation of rules regarding foreign ownership.
There is a general consensus that India’s privatization in the 1990s significantly im-
proved efficiency of the privatized firms, notwithstanding the relatively small portion
of equity that was divested (Gupta 2005, Sarkar and Sensarma 2010, Pratap 2011; for
studies of privatization in later years, see Mandiratta and Bhalla 2017, who arrive at
the same conclusion). Consistent with evidence from privatization episodes in other
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countries (Kikeri 1998, Megginson and Netter 2001, Birdsall and Nellis 2003), Pratap
(2011) estimates a sharp decline in employment in the privatized firms, of approxi-
mately 18% in CPSEs that were privatized by share issue, and of approximately 30%
in CPSEs privatized by asset sale (see also Naib 2003).4
It is worth noting that the estimated employment decline in privatized firms oc-
curred on top of an overall decline in employment in public sector enterprises as a
whole: Figure 1, which is based on employment statistics from the Public Enterprises
Survey of the Government of India, shows that employment in Central Public Sector
Enterprises (CPSEs) increased to a peak of 2.2 million workers in 1990, after which it
began a steady decline in the post-reform era. This reduction is thought (Singh and
Chittedi 2011, Nagaraj 2014) to largely reflect the introduction of Voluntary Retirement
Schemes (VRS), which provided reasonably generous (voluntary) severance packages
to workers. The Central Government also established a National Renewal Fund (NRF)
in 1992, among whose objectives was to finance retraining programs for workers who
had been made redundant in public sector enterprises. The specifics of VRS schemes
varied across PSEs, and the lack of systematic data on these schemes implies that little
is known about which workers were induced to leave and which ones stayed; we also
know little about the subsequent labor market experiences of the retrenched workers.
Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) discuss the effects of a large retrenchment in the public
sector textile industry in India in 1993-94: Survey evidence cited by the authors sug-
gests that all the retrenched workers stayed in the labor force, with nearly 80% of them
being re-employed soon after. If these experiences are typical of other restructuring
programs in India, a natural question is whether the associated reallocation of workers
between the public and private sectors was efficiency-improving in the aggregate. Our
study attempts to answer this question.
4Gupta (2005), using the data from the same source as Pratap (2011) but over a shorter time-span,
does not find a significant change in employment.
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3 Data
3.1 District-level privatization data
Data on the public sector companies that were subjected to disinvestment was com-
piled from two principal sources. The Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (BSE) main-
tains a databse on share offerings and sales of central public sector enterprises;5 we
cross-checked this database with data from the World Bank’s Privatization Transac-
tions Database. We then drew on public records, news reports, company websites, and
other source material to identify the factory locations of central public sector enter-
prises (CPSEs) that were included in this wave of disinvestment. We used this infor-
mation to construct a district-level dataset that records the timing and extent of expo-
sure to disinvestment at the district level. To do so, we define a privatization "event"
when at least one of the central public sector manufacturing enterprises in a district
experienced disinvestment in a given year. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to
districts that experienced at least one privatization event as "privatized districts".
Figure 1 presents a district map showing the location of privatized districts. As
the figure shows, there is significant spatial variation in the distribution of privatized
districts in our data, consistent with the breadth of the public sector presence in man-
ufacturing. At the same time, there is evidence of some clustering of privatizations
(which partially reflects spatial clustering in the presence of public sector factories) -
for instance, the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu expe-
rienced a number of privatizations. This fact has a potentially important implication
for our identification strategy, as we discuss later.
Our focus on districts as an appropriate level at which to analyze labor reallocation
reflects an assumption that labour markets in India tend to be fairly local, a view that
5http://www.bsepsu.com/
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is shared by a number of other studies (see, for example, Topalova 2007, Topalova
2010, Adhvaryu et al 2011). This assumption is also supported by the observation that
rates of internal migration in India are among the lowest in the world (Bell 2015) and
migration tends to be predominantly within-district (Kone et al 2016; see also Atkin
2016).
3.2 Factory data
The analysis uses factory data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) spanning
the period 1985-2009, with the exception of 1995-1997. 6 Each year pertains to an
accounting period; for example, the 1985 survey pertains to the 1985-86 accounting
year that spans April 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986.
The sampling universe for the ASI is all firms that are registered under sections
2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act as well as firms registered under the Bidi & Cigar
Workers Act and a number of utility and service providers. We restrict attention to
manufacturing establishments. Large firms are surveyed every year (the “census” sec-
tor), while smaller firms are covered on a sampling basis (the “sample” sector). 7 Each
unit surveyed is generally a factory (establishment); however, if an owner has two
factories in the same state, sector (census versus sample) and industry, a joint return
can be furnished. In the population of firms, fewer than 2 percent of the observations
6India’s Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation does not make the data for 1995 avail-
able. The 1996 and 1997 data are available; however, we were unable to construct input measures con-
sistent with those in other years. The structure of the questionnaires in these two years is different from
those in other years, and examining input values constructed from 1996 and 1997 suggests that the ag-
gregate input values are not in line with the general patterns observed during the rest of the time period.
Thus, we considered the data from these years to be potentially incompatible with the other years and
excluded them.
7The division between the two sectors depends on firm size, and changed several times between
1985 and 2009. For most years during this period, factories with 100 or more workers were covered in
the census sector. During several years, though, the census sector was defined as including factories
with 200 or more workers or with a certain value of output. In additional, factories in a number of
“less industrially developed" states were also included in the census sector, although the specific states
included changed to some extent during this period.
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report having more than one factory.
The ASI data contain information on factory ownership that allow us to classify
firms according to whether they are publicly or privately owned. Beyond identifying
the districts in which they are located,8 we do not attempt to pinpoint the privatized
firms in the ASI data.9 While this implies that we cannot make precise statements
about the effect of privatization on outcomes for the privatized factory, we can and do
examine outcomes for the set of public sector firms in a district - as we will see, this
level of aggregation still allows for informative analysis of the effects of privatization.
We deflate output using industry-specific wholesale price indices (WPI) from the
Government of India’s Handbook of Industrial Statistics. Similarly, we construct ma-
terial input deflators using the WPI along with India’s 1993-94 Input-Output Trans-
actions Table. Labor is measured as the total number of individuals employed by
the factory, and capital is measured by deflating the book value of fixed assets by an
industry-level capital deflator calculated using the perpetual inventory method. For
the district-level analysis, we construct district aggregate estimates of output, labor,
capital, and materials. We only include factories that are open and that report positive
values of these variables.
For each factory (and year), we calculate total factory productivity using the chain-
linked index number method proposed by Good et al (1997). We employ this method
for two key reasons. First, in order to construct the long time series that covers the pe-
riod of major privatizations in India, we must compile pooled cross-sectional data on
factories, since panel data are not available until 1998. Thus, state-of-the-art produc-
tion function estimation methods which rely on panel data cannot be applied in this
8During this period, a number of changes were made to the administrative boundaries of districts
in India. To address this challenge, we constructed a district concordance that mapped each district in
each year, to a common code. For example, if one district was split into two districts, we mapped each
of the two new districts, and the original district, to the same district code.
9Doing so would effectively de-anonymize the data, which we cannot do under the data use agree-
ment. In any event, the lack of panel identifiers in the data implies that it is not straightforward to
identify the privatized factories even with knowledge of their industry and location.
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context. These approaches also require an accurate identification of exit, which is not
feasible in our data given that many of the factories are covered on a sampling basis, i.e.
when we observe a factory in one year but not the next, we cannot determine whether
it has exited, or whether the factory was simply not selected for sampling during the
second year.
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we utilize the method of Good et al
(1997). Using this method, we calculate TFP of firm i in industry j in year t as:
TFPijt = (qijt   qjt)| {z }
deviation f rom avg. q
+
t
∑
r=2
(qjr   qjr 1)
| {z }
yearly change in q
 
 K
∑
k=1
1
2
(Skijt + S
k
jt)(kijt   k jt)
| {z }
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+
t
∑
r=2
K
∑
k=1
1
2
(Skjr + S
k
jr 1)(k jr   k jr 1)
| {z }
yearly change in k

(1)
The first two terms are the deviation of factory i’s output relative to average output
in industry j in year t, and the deviation between average output in industry j in year
t, relative to the base year. The third and fourth terms are the deviation of factory i’s
inputs relative to average inputs in industry j in year t, and the deviation between
average inputs in industry j in year t, relative to the base year. TFP is obtained by
summing the first two terms and subtracting the third and fourth terms. The revenue
share of labor is calculated as total emoluments divided by the value of output, while
the revenue share of material is calculated as the cost of materials divided by the value
of output. We assume that the capital share is equal to 1 minus the labor plus ma-
terial shares. Input shares and average output and inputs are allowed to vary across
industries.
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3.3 Data on other reforms
India also undertook a series of other reforms after facing the balance-of-payments
crisis in 1991. Between 1991 and 1997, tariffs were harmonized and dramatically re-
duced; the average final goods tariff on manufactured goods fell from 95 to 35 percent
(Harrison et al. 2012). India also continued the dismantling of its licensing scheme,
which had begun during the 1980s. Under the “License Raj”, large firms had to ob-
tain licenses, which included restrictions on their output and the types of goods they
could produce. About one-third of industries were delicensed in 1985; most remain-
ing industries were delicensed during the post-1991 reforms (Aghion et al. 2008). In
addition, the 1991 reforms saw changes in foreign direct investment (FDI) policy; “au-
tomatic” approval of majority FDI was allowed in about one-third of industries, and
further liberalization took place later in the decade (Sivadasan 2009).
We constructed a measure of final goods tariffs at the industry level by mapping
applied tariff data from the Government of India’s Customs Tariff Working Schedules
and Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) to India’s three-digit National
Industrial Classification (NIC-87) codes, using the concordance developed by Debroy
and Santhanam (1993). We then calculated input tariffs at the industry level, using the
industry-level final goods tariffs and India’s 1993-94 Input-Output Transactions Table,
following the method suggested by Amiti and Konings (2007). For the delicensing
and FDI reforms, we started with liberalization data from Aghion et al. (2008), and
added more recent information using Press Notes from the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry. The delicensing and FDI reform variables are equal to one if any products
in a three-digit industry have been liberalized and are equal to zero otherwise. For
further details on these reforms, see Harrison et al. (2012).
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4 Conceptual framework
The basic intuition underlying the static misallocation idea is formalized in general
terms by Hsieh and Klenow (2008). We outline here a model that focuses attention on
some specific considerations that arise in the context of labor allocation between public
and private sector firms. Our objective here is not to construct a fully fleshed-out equi-
librium model, but rather to lay out a simple framework that clarify the interpretation
of our results, in addition to suggesting some testable hypotheses.
Consider a local economy (this would correspond to a district in our data), in which
aggregate output is the sum of public and private sector output:
Y = Ypub +Ypriv
Now consider a small reduction in public sector employment, ∆Lpub. Suppose that
this labor is reallocated to other sectors, with the private sector in the district capturing
a fraction pi. Then, the change in aggregate output is approximately given by:
∆Y  MP
pub
L ∆L
pub   MP
priv
L (pi∆L
pub)
= (MP
pub
L   piMP
priv
L )∆L
pub
The resulting change in aggregate output therefore depends on (a) the difference
in marginal productivities between the public and private sectors, (b) the amount of
labor retrenched in the public sector, and (c) the amount of retrenched labor that is
rehired in the private sector in the district. pi could depend on the composition of
the retrenched workers: If the retrenchment process results in "cream skimming", the
retrenched workers will on average be relatively able and therefore likely to find new
jobs quickly. It could also depend on the existing labor regime- e.g. if the economy is
subjected to significant hiring/firing restrictions, then pi may be very small, with the
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majority of retrenched workers ending up in unemployment or in the informal sector.
The last point noted above highlights the fact that there are two potential "leakages"
of labor that we cannot observe in our data, since we do not observe either informal
output or the rate of unemployment in the district. A distinct "leakage" occurs when
displaced workers move to other districts. While we can always estimate the effect
on formal sector output, the effect on aggregate district output (including formal as
well as informal sectors) would appear ambiguous. However, our thought experiment
above clarifies that as long as the effect on formal sector output is positive, the total
effect must also be positive - i.e. if the reduction in public sector output is already
offset by output increases in the formal private sector, then the additional workers
lost due to "leakage" can at worst add nothing to output (for instance, by entering the
unemployment rolls), so that the total output effect must be at least as large as that
observed in the formal sector. Thus, in this special case (which is what obtains in our
data), the observed effect on formal sector output places a lower bound on the total
effect. It follows by a similar argument that output per worker must also increase in
the district.
5 Descriptives
To set the stage for the analysis, we begin with descriptive regressions that compare
public and private sector enterprises on a number of dimensions. To do so, we regress
each of a set of factory-level outcomes on an indicator for a (central) public sector en-
terprise (CPSE). Table 2 shows the results. CPSEs are 3-4 times bigger than private
sector factories in terms of output, employment and capital; remarkably, the former
are significantly less efficient in terms of TFP as well as labor productivity (Majumdar
1996 obtains a similar set of findings for the period 1973-1989) ; notwithstanding, real
wages in the public sector are twice as large as those in the private sector. These conclu-
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sions stand largely unchanged even if we control for 3-digit industry and district fixed
effects (the results are reported in Appendix Table 1), implying that CPSEs are bigger
and less productive than other firms in their sector, as well as relative to other firms in
their local labor market. The latter observation in particular confirms the hypothesis
that the public sector is a significant source of distortion in the labor market.
Our main analysis uses a district-level panel. Figure 2 shows the distribution of
district-level privatization events (as defined earlier) over the sample period. There are
two clusters of events, one in the early 1990s, immediately following the economic re-
forms of 1991, and a second cluster in the early 2000s. Table 3 presents means and stan-
dard deviations for aggregate district-level outcomes, separately for three groups:(i)
Districts that did not have any CPSEs (of which there are 129), (ii) Districts that had
at least one CPSE but did not experience a privatization event (of which there are 74),
and (iii) Districts that experienced a privatization event (of which there are 67). Look-
ing at the latter two sets of districts, we observe that on average CPSEs account for
a significant share (approximately 10%) of district-level output and employment. It is
also apparent that districts that have CPSEs are clearly bigger than those that do not, in
terms of aggregate output, employment, capital and the number of factories. Districts
that experienced a privatization tend to be slightly larger than districts that had CPSEs
but were not subjected to privatization, although the differences in average public sec-
tor size are less pronounced. These observations have important implications for our
identification strategy, as we explain in the next section.
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6 Analysis
6.1 Empirical specification
We now turn to estimating the effects of privatization on district-level outcomes. As
we saw in Table 3, districts that experienced a privatization are very different from dis-
tricts that did not (and even more different from districts that did not have even have
a CPSE), implying that cross-sectional comparisons of privatized and non-privatized
districts will not identify the effect of privatization. We therefore adopt a difference-
in-differences estimation strategy that compares changes in outcomes for privatized
districts and non-privatized districts, while controlling for (time-invariant) differences
between districts. The identification is now based on the assumption that the outcomes
in privatized districts would not have changed differently from those in non-privatized
districts in the absence of privatization.
We strengthen the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption in a number of
ways. First, we restrict the sample in the main specification to only include districts
that experienced at least one privatization, i.e. the identification is based on a com-
parison of privatized and not-yet-privatized districts - this addresses the concern that
CPSEs that were privatized (and the districts that they were located in) were systemati-
cally different fromCPSEs that were not privatized. Evenwithin the sample of districts
that were privatized, however, there may be a concern that the timing of privatization
was endogenous to district outcomes. To address this issue, we include district-specific
trends that account for the possibility that treated and control districts may have been
characterized by different trends in the outcome variables. Third, to account for the
spatial clustering of privatization events, we control for state x year fixed effects, in
order to ensure that the effect of district-level privatization is not confounded with the
effects of concurrent changes in state-level policies (such as changes in labor regula-
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tion).
Some districts experience more than one privatization event. To fully utilize this
policy variation, we specify our panel difference-in-differences regression as follows:
ydst = α+ βPrivatizationdt + ηd + ηst + γdt+ edst (2)
where ydt denotes an outcome of interest for district d in year t; Privatizationdt is
a multi-valued treatment variable that counts the number of privatization events ex-
perienced by district d up to and including year t; ηd denotes a district fixed effect, ηst
denotes a state x year fixed effect and γdt denotes district-specific linear time trends.
The standard errors in the regression are adjusted for clustering at the district level.
6.2 Effects on aggregate output, employment and capital
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (2), for each of a set of aggre-
gate district-level outcomes including output, employment, capital, and the number of
factories. For comparison, we show results from three samples, starting with the full
sample of districts (Panel A), and then dropping districts that do not have any CPSEs
(Panel B), before finally dropping districts that were not privatized (Panel C). The re-
sults obtained in the full sample are clearly different in sign and statistical significance
from those obtained in the more restricted samples, which highlights the importance of
appropriately restricting the control group in the analysis. A consistent finding in the
restricted samples is that privatization has resulted in an increase in aggregate district-
level output. The point estimates imply an approximately 5% increase in aggregate
output following a privatization event. We do not, however, find a statistically signifi-
cant increase in aggregate labor or capital inputs, or in the number of factories. While
the estimates for output are similar in magnitude between the samples in Panels B and
C, they are slightly larger in Panel C (the most restricted sample). In the remainder
19
of the analysis, we retain this sample restriction, i.e. dropping districts that were not
privatized.
In the foregoing analysis, we have implicitly imposed the restriction that all priva-
tization events in a district have the same effect. While the assumption is not unrea-
sonable, one may still theorize that subsequent privatizations in a district may have
had a different impact from the first event - for instance, the first event may represent
a greater "shock" than subsequent ones, or conversely, it may require multiple events
to kickstart the rationalization process in the public sector, in which case later priva-
tizations may have larger effects. To test between these hypotheses, we estimate a
modified specification in which the multi-valued treatment variable is separated out
into dummies for each of the multiple values. The results are presented in Column 1
of Table 5. While it is clear that the effect on output cumulates with multiple privati-
zation events (as one would have expected), there is some indication that subsequent
privatizations may have larger impacts (however the standard errors are large enough
that we are not able to rule out equality of the various effects).
A second refinement is to test whether the effects differ between minority-sale pri-
vatizations (in which the government retains majority ownership of the firm) and ma-
jority sales (in which at least 50% of company stock is sold). Accordingly, we further
refine the previous specification to distinguish between the two kinds of privatization
events (Column 2 of Table 5). Interestingly, the effects on aggregate output only appear
to obtain for partial privatizations, but we should caution that the limited number of
asset sales in the sample period as well as the truncation of the sample shortly there-
after places a limitation on our power to make a precise statement in this regard.
6.3 Validity checks
We now conduct a number of checks on the main result.
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Testing for anticipatory changes: Although the policy of disinvestment was signaled
in the 1991 Statement on Industrial Policy, the actual pace of privatization was slow.
This raises a potential concern in terms of our identification: An observation that is
commonly made in studies of privatization is that long gaps between the announce-
ment and the actual implementation of reform induce anticipatory changes in the per-
formance of public sector firms (see, for example, Yarrow 1992 for a discussion of this
phenomenon in the context of privatization in the United Kingdom). The Indian case is
notably different, as Kapur and Ramamurti (2002) argue, because of the government’s
low-key (or, alternatively, "stealth") approach to privatization in the initial decade, as a
result of which managers at public sector firms "behaved as if the changes expected of
them were incremental and marginal" (Kapur and Ramamurti 2002).
In order to formally assess whether there were any significant changes that an-
ticipated the privatization event at the district-level, we estimate a specification that
includes six leads and lags of the privatization treatment variable. The regression sam-
ple is now restricted to districts that experienced only one privatization event. The
regression specification is as follows:
ydst = α+
k=6
∑
k= 6,k 6= 1
βT+kPrivatized(T + k)dt + ηd + ηst + γdt+ εjdt (3)
where Privatized(T + k)jdt is an indicator for k years after the privatization event in
the district, and so on. The coefficients βT+k represent differential effects relative to the
omitted lag of T   1. The size and significance of the lead coefficients βT 2, βT 3, etc
can therefore be directly examined to test for any anticipatory effects. Table 6 reports
the results from the leads and lags specification estimated for aggregate output, and
Figure 3 plots the corresponding β coefficients and confidence intervals. The coeffi-
cients on the treatment lead variables are mostly small and statistically insignificant,
and there is little indication of any increases in output that anticipate the privatization
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event in the district, confirming our initial hypothesis.
Permutation test: Next, we implement a permutation test to provide an alternative
assessment of the statistical significance of the results.10 We first randomly assign pri-
vatization events across districts, while restricting the number of privatization events
in each year to match the actual number of events in the data. We then estimate the
difference-in-differences specification in Equation (2) for this placebo treatment assign-
ment, and repeat this procedure 100 times. Figure 4 graphs the empirical cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) of the estimated treatment effects; the red vertical line
marks the “actual” treatment effect that was obtained using the actual assignment of
privatization events. The actual treatment effect lies well outside the range of the dis-
tribution of placebo treatment effects, providing a strong confirmation that our results
are not a statistical artefact.
Robustness to controlling for background reforms: A potentially important threat to
identification that we have not so far addressed arises from the fact that the priva-
tization reforms overlapped with (and were in fact initiated at the same time as) a
broader set of economic reforms that included tariff liberalization, FDI liberalization,
and industrial deregulation (by means of abolition of the industrial licensing policy).
If privatized districts were dominated by firms that were either heavily exposed or
underexposed to these other reforms (relative to firms in districts that were privatized
later), this would undermine our identification of the privatization reform. Given the
industry-specific nature of the other reforms, we control for the effects of the back-
ground reforms by constructing a district-industry panel (whereas our previous analy-
sis uses a district level panel). We estimate the following specification on the district-
industry panel:
yjdst = α+ βPrivatizationdt + γXjt + ηd + η j + ηst + γdt+ edst (4)
10See Chetty et al (2010) and Martin et al (2017) for analogous tests.
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where yjdst now denotes aggregate output for (3-digit) industry j in district d in
year t; Xjt is a vector of time-varying industry-specific controls for (i) Output tariffs, (ii)
Input tariffs, (iii) An indicator for FDI liberalization, and (iv) An indicator for licensing
reform. The specification also controls for industry fixed effects (η j). The specification
can be strengthened further by allowing for industry x year fixed effects, η jt - these will
absorb all industry-specific shocks, including the effects of the background reforms. As
before, the standard errors in the regression are adjusted for clustering at the district
level.
The results are reported in Table 7. Column 1 reports the results of the specifica-
tion with the background reform controls. The coefficients on the background reform
variables are consistent with intuition as well as with the findings of the existing liter-
ature: Output increases sharply with a reduction in input tariffs, while an increase in
output tariffs has a relatively small effect, echoing the findings of Harrison et al. (2012).
Licensing reform has little effect on output, consistent with the findings of Aghion et
al (2008),11 as does FDI reform. Turning to the effects of privatization, the estimated
effect remains statistically significant and retains its magnitude (approximately a 4%
increase in output), and this conclusion is unaffected by the inclusion of industry x
year fixed effects (Column 2). These results provide reassurance that our district-level
identification strategy is robust to contemporaneous changes in other aspects of eco-
nomic policy.
6.4 Between-sector labor reallocation
Our fundamental hypothesis was that privatization may result in a rationalization
within the public sector that should effectively release workers to more efficient uses
in the private sector (the latter, as we saw earlier, exhibits a higher marginal product of
11Instead, Aghion et al (2008) find that delicensing only has an effect in settings where labor regula-
tions are less severe.
23
labor than the public sector). We now test this hypothesis in the data by estimating the
effect of privatization on employment in the private and public sectors, respectively.
The results are reported in Column 1-3 of Table 8 (Column 4-6 report the correspond-
ing results for output). Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe an increase in
private sector employment and output, while public sector output and employment
register declines. The observed decline in public sector employment is consistent with
other studies of privatization in India (Pratap 2011, Naib 2003), and can be partially
explained by the fact that some privatized firms shed workers, but likely also reflects a
freeze on new hiring in these enterprises, which would also have resulted in a relative
reduction over time in the size of the public sector in each district.
The reallocational hypothesis can be tested with a more disaggregated analysis of
the data. An intuitive hypothesis is that the workers shed by the public sector entity
in a district would be more likely to be rehired in similar occupations elsewhere in the
private sector (than in dissimilar occupations). We test this hypothesis by examining
whether labor tends to flow towards firms that are "closer" to the public sector firm in
terms of producing similar goods. To implement this test, we turn again to the district-
industry panel. For each industry, we construct a measure of proximity to the public
sector as the (absolute) difference between the 3-digit industry code of the industry and
the industry code of the privatized firm in that district. We then estimate the following
regression:
yjdst = α+ β1Privatizationdt + β2Privatizationdt  Distancejd + β3Distancejd
+ηd + η jt + ηst + γdt+ edst (5)
where Distancejd denotes the proximity measure. Our hypothesis is that β1 should
be positive, while β2 is negative, i.e. employment gains should be smaller the further
away an industry is from the public sector firm. Table 9 reports the results of the regres-
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sion, separately for output and employment.12 Private sector employment and output
increase by 9% in the industry of the privatized firm (for which the distance measure
is zero), and this effect declines by approximately 0.2% for each unit of distance (i.e. an
industry that is ten 3-digit codes away from the privatized industry will only see an
employment gain of 7%, and so on). These results provide a sharp confirmation of the
hypothesis that employment gains in the private sector reflect labor reallocation away
from the public sector.
The discussion of the conceptual framework in Section 4 suggested that the extent
to which the private sector can absorb the workers shed by the privatized firm is a
function of the existing labor regime. In the Indian context, it is known that strin-
gent employment protection legislation acts as a curb on hiring (see, for example, Ad-
hvaryu, Chari and Sharma 2011): Private sector firms may be very reluctant to hire
new workers if there are significant costs associated with downsizing in the future. We
therefore test whether privatization results in a smaller increase in private sector em-
ployment in states characterized by more rigid labor laws. To implement this test, we
rely on Besley and Burgess’ (2004) coding of labor regulations to identify states that
were classified as "pro-worker" in 1991 (prior to the reform) - these are states which
have enacted significant restrictions on firing and dismissal of workers. We then test
for heterogeneity in treatmnent effects along this dimension. Table 9.1 reports the esti-
mated effects of privatization on private sector employment and output, separately for
pro-worker and non pro-worker states. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that
the employment and output effects do appear to be smaller in magnitude (and not sta-
tistically significant) in pro-worker states, lending some substance to the idea that the
aggregate effects of privatization depend on the features of the policy environment.
The conclusion from our various tests above is that there has been a significant
12Differently from the district-industry panel analysis in Table 6, employment and output are now
only constructed for the private sector, in order to exclude outward labor flows from the public sector.
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reallocation of labor from public to private sectors as a result of privatization. It is
plausible, especially in light of our conceptual discussion, that this is the mechanism
underlying the observed increase in economy-wide output. In the next section, we at-
tempt to formalize the contribution of inter-sectoral labor reallocation to productivity
growth. Before doing so, we consider here a second testable implication of the realloca-
tional hypothesis: The extent to which labor reallocation increases net economy-wide
output will depend on the productivity gap between public and private sectors. We
test this hypothesis by constructing a measure of the difference between private sec-
tor and public sector worker productivity in the pre-reform period (i.e. pre-1991). We
then divide districts into two categories based on whether they have above or below
median productivity gap in the pre-reform period. We then ask whether the increase
in aggregate output is greater in districts with an above-median baseline productivity
gap. Table 9.2 presents the results: We do indeed find the effect on aggregate output is
large and statistically significant in districts which exhibited a large productivity gap,
whereas the effect is four times smaller and not statistically significant in the other
districts.
6.5 Decomposing productivity gains
We now test the significance of the reallocational mechanism in terms of its contribu-
tion to the observed increase in aggregate output. To do so, we utilize the following
decomposition of aggregate productivity suggested by Olley and Pakes (1993):
Idt = ∑ widtφidt = E(φidtjd, t) +∑(widt   E(widtjd, t))(φidt   E(φidtjv, t))
where the index Idt denotes district-level aggregate TFP at time t, and is defined
as the labor-share weighted average of factory-level TFPs (in logarithms), where widt
denotes the labor-share of the i-th factory in district d. The aggregate index is decom-
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posed into two components: A component that measures the productivity of the aver-
age factory, E(φidtjd, t), and a "covariance" term that measures the extent to which size
(measured here by labor share) is correlated with TFP.13 As Bartelsman, Haltiwanger
and Scarpetta (2013) show, the Olley-Pakes covariance term is a reliable measure of
the efficiency of resource allocation that tends to vary systematically with changes in
the economic regime. Our expectation is that privatization should result in an increase
in the covariance term, as labor gets reallocated from low- to high-productivity facto-
ries. If productivity improves in the privatized firm, and/or if there are productivity
spillovers to the other firms in the district, we may also observe an increase in average
productivity (the first term in the Olley-Pakes decomposition).
We estimate the difference-in-differences specification on the separate terms of the
decomposition to understand the sources of aggregate productivity growth. Table 10
reports the regression results. The point estimates indicate an aggregate TFP increase
of approximately 10%, although this estimate is only statistically significant at the 10%
level of significance. Remarkably, there is a significant increase in the covariance term,
which accounts for nearly the entire increase in aggregate TFP. The remaining increase
in aggregate TFP is attributed to an increase in average productivity, and this effect
is not statistically distinguishable from zero. These results strongly suggest that the
aggregate productivity effects of privatization arise from reallocations that improve
aggregate productivity, in line with our basic hypothesis.
The reallocational hypothesis suggests more specifically that productivity gains
flow from reallocation of labor between the private and public sector. To narrow in
on this mechanism, we apply a decomposition of covariance that separates out the ef-
fect of labor reallocation within sectors from the effect of labor reallocation between
13The "covariance" term in this decomposition is really N times the covariance between labor shares
and TFP, where N is the number of production units. That is, the decomposition can be seen to be a
simple rewriting of the expression for the covariance between labor shares and TFP.
27
sectors:
covOP  ∑(widt   E(widtjd, t))(φidt   E(φidtjd, t))
= N  cov(widt, φidt)
= N  E[cov(widt, φidtjs)] + N  cov(E(widtjs), E(φidtjs)
where s denotes sector (public or private), and we have now suppressed the condi-
tioning on d and t in order to avoid notational clutter. The equation above shows that
the Olley-Pakes covariance term can be decomposed into within-sector and between-
sector components.14
Table 11 reports the results from estimating the difference-in-differences specifi-
cation for each of the covariance components. Column 1 replays the results for the
full covariance term, and Columns 2 and 3 display results for the within-sector and
between-sector components, respectively. The separate effects are not well-estimated,
but with that caveat, it appears that the increase in covariance is entirely accounted
for by an increase in the between-sector covariance, implying in turn that the entire
increase in aggregate productivity reflects a reallocation of labor between the private
and public sectors. These results are a striking confirmation of the reallocational hy-
pothesis.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we take advantage of historical episodes of privatization in India to study
the aggregate efficiency losses due to state-ownership of manufacturing enterprises.
Our results indicate that privatization of a factory results in a substantial increase in
aggregate output and productivity in the local district economy.
14This decomposition is sometimes referred to as the law of total covariance.
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Our results constitute the first rigorous quantification of the effects of state-ownership
on aggregate productivity, and confirm the importance of factor misallocation as a
source of low aggregate productivity in developing countries, while focusing on a spe-
cific source of distortion that has not received rigorous evaluation. More directly, our
study is an important contribution to the literature on SOEs that has so far largely fo-
cused on the implications of state-ownership and different modes of privatization on
the productivity of the SOEs themselves. In doing so we fill a gap in the broader debate
regarding the social desirability of privatization. First, our estimates suggest that the
aggregate efficiency gains from privatization may in fact be more significant than the
performance gains in the privatized enterprise. A notable aspect of the results is that in
most cases of privatization in our data the state continued to retain majority ownership
of the SOE, implying that even partial privatization is associated with significant ratio-
nalization, an implication that is consistent with the findings of Gupta (2005), Pratap
(2011) and Bartel and Harrison (2005). Second, our results on labor reallocation are
especially significant, given that the prospect of employment losses is a key issue sur-
rounding privatizations in most countries, including India, where the phenomenon of
"jobless growth" has particularly intensified the opposition to privatization. A caveat
to these findings is that the largest employment losses are usually associated with full
privatizations or asset sales (Pratap 2011), whereas the employment losses associated
with partial privatizations (which are the focus of our study) are most modest, and
there may accordingly be greater scope for laid-off workers to be absorbed into the
private sector.
Our study is limited in scope in at least two important ways. First, we should em-
phasize that our results do not necessarily imply that privatization is the preferred
alternative to state-ownership. Indeed, the literature has discussed a number of alter-
natives to privatization, including market deregulation, that may in some situations be
just as effective as transfer of ownership of public sector firms (Vickers and Yarow 1992,
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Trebilcock and Smith 1995, Bartel and Harrison 2002). Whether the broader package
of market reforms initiated in India in the 1990s had a similar effect on public sector
firms (and on their private sector neighbors) remains an open question. Second, we
have focused on labor market distortions, but the external effects of privatization need
not be limited to labour market channels. Privatization of upstream industries may
impact the cost and quality of inputs to downstream industries, with implications for
the latter’s profitability. External effects flowing through forward linkages are likely to
be of particular significance in countries where the public sector is heavily involved in
primary industries, energy and infrastructure, as well as capital goods (as has been the
case in countries following the Soviet model). Accounting for these external effects is
a second important avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: The map shows the location of privatized districts.
Figure 2. District-level privatization events in the sample period.
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Figure 3. The figure plots the leads and lags of treatment effects on aggregate output, along with the 
associated 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4. Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of placebo treatment effects on aggregate 
output. The actual effect is shown by the red vertical line.
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Company Mode of privatization
Andrew Yule and Company Limited SIP
Bharat Earthmovers Ltd. SIP
Bharat Electronics Ltd. SIP
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. SIP
Bharat Petroleum Corp SIP
Bongaigaon Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. (BRPL) SIP
GAIL (India) Limited SIP
HMT Ltd SIP
Hindustan Cables Ltd. SIP
Hindustan Copper SIP
Hindustan Petroleum Corp SIP
Hindustan Photofilms Manufacturing Co. SIP
Hindustan Teleprinters Asset sale
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. SIP
HMT Ltd SIP
Indian Petrochemical Corporation SIP
Modern Food Industries Asset sale
National Aluminium Co. Ltd. SIP
National Fertilizers Ltd. SIP
National Mineral Development Corp. SIP
Neyveli Lignite Corp. SIP
Oil & Natural Gas Corporation SIP
Paradeep Phosphates Asset sale
Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers SIP
Steel Authority of India SIP
Travancore Fertilizer & Chemicals SIP
Table 1. CPSEs privatized in 1991-2004
Notes: the table lists Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) that were divested during the period 1991-2004. SIP 
refers to share-issue privatization, in which the government offers a share of equity in the CPSE to the public.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Workers Capital TFP
Marginal 
product Wage
Public 2.56*** 2.42*** 3.04*** -0.57*** -342.15* 1.02***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.09) (189.71) (0.03)
Observations 277,371 272,658 284,834 263,156 283,000 278,340
Table 2. Public vs private sector factories
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at district level. All variables are in logarithms, except for the marginal product of labor. The regressions 
control for district fixed effects and year fixed effects, and the sample is restricted to the pre-reform period 1985-1990.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Aggregate Output 0.18 0.26 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.45
Employment 0.83 2.03 1.48 1.73 1.62 1.69
Capital 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.29 0.24 0.42
No of firms 52.59 84.64 107.39 110.42 108.07 109.59
Public sector output share 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.22
Public sector employment share 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.18
Districts with no 
CPSEs
Districts with CPSEs 
but not privatized
Districts that 
experienced 
privatization
Table 3. Summary statistics at district level
Notes: The table presents means and standard deviations of district-level total output, employment, capital and number of firms, as well as the share 
of employment and output in the district accounted for by the public sector. Aggregate output and capital are measured in 10 billion rupees (base 
1993); Employment is measured in units of 10,000 workers.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Employment Capital No of factories
Panel A: All districts
Privatization 0.019 -0.008 0.053 -1.786
(0.019) (0.058) (0.036) (2.883)
Observations 4,414 4,414 4,414 4,414
Panel B: Only districts with CPSE's
Privatization 0.040** 0.028 0.070 1.302
(0.020) (0.081) (0.045) (3.818)
Observations 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272
Panel C: Only districts that experienced privatization
Privatization 0.046* 0.037 0.047 1.224
(0.024) (0.104) (0.042) (3.648)
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,128
Table 4. Privatization and district outcomes
Notes: All regressions include district fixed effects, state x year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. Aggregate 
output and capital are measured in 10 billion rupees (base 1993); Employment is measured in units of 10,000 workers.  
Standard errors are clustered at district level. Privatization  is a multi-valued treatment variable that counts the number of 
privatizations events in a district up to and including the current year.
Dependent variable: Aggregate output (1) (2)
First privatization event 0.038
(0.033)
Second privatization event 0.093*
(0.050)
Third privatization event 0.211***
(0.068)
First privatization event (SIP) 0.063*
(0.033)
Second privatization event (SIP) 0.103**
(0.049)
Third privatization event (SIP) 0.182***
(0.055)
First privatization event (Asset sale) -0.051
(0.091)
Observations 1,126 1,126
Table 5. Alternative specifications
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district level. All regressions include district fixed effects, state x 
year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. Aggregate output is measured in 10 billion rupees (base 1993). 
SIP refers to share-issue privatization, in which the government offers a share of equity in the CPSE to the public. 
Asset sale refers to an outright sale of a firm. 
(1)
Output
Privatized (t-4) 0.025
(0.101)
Privatized (t-3) -0.005
(0.040)
Privatized (t-2) 0.023
(0.041)
Privatized (t=0) 0.083***
(0.031)
Privatized (t+1) 0.073*
(0.037)
Privatized (t+2) 0.069
(0.044)
Observations 888
Table 6. Leads and lags of treatment effects
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district level. All regressions include district fixed 
effects, state x year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. Aggregate output is measured in 10 
billion rupees (base 1993). 
Dependent variable: Aggregate output (1) (2)
Privatization 0.001** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI reform 0.001
(0.001)
License reform -0.001
(0.001)
Input tariff -0.031***
(0.005)
Output tariff 0.002
(0.001)
Observations 60,966 60,929
Table 7. Robustness to controlling for other reforms (district-industry panel)
Notes: All regressions include district fixed effects, 3-digit industry fixed effects, state x year fixed effects and district-
specific linear trends. The regression in Column 2 also controls for 3-digit industry x year fixed effects. Aggregate output 
is measured in 10 billion rupees (base 1993); Standard errors are clustered at district level. Privatization  is a multi-
valued treatment variable that counts the number of privatizations events in a district up to and including the current 
year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Private Share public Public Private
Share 
public
Privatization -0.451 0.073 -0.056** -0.713 0.120 -0.051
(0.805) (0.098) (0.024) (1.496) (0.129) (0.033)
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,128
Employment Output
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district level. All regressions include district fixed effects, state x year fixed effects and district-specific linear 
trends. The dependent variables in Column 1,2, 4 and 5 are in logarithms. Aggregate output is measured in 10 billion rupees (base 1993); Employment is 
measured in units of 10,000 workers.  Privatization  is a multi-valued treatment variable that counts the number of privatizations events in a district up to and 
including the current year. 
Table 8. Between-sector reallocation of employment and output shares 
(1) (2)
Employment Output
Privatization 0.090* 0.092**
(0.051) (0.039)
Privatization x Distance -0.002** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Distance -0.001* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 60,415 60,956
Table 9. Proximity and reallocation (district-industry panel)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district level. All regressions include district fixed effects, 3-digit 
industry x year fixed effects, state x year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. The dependent variables are in 
logarithms. Aggregate output is measured in 10 billion rupees (base 1993); Employment is measured in units of 10,000 
workers. Distance  is measured as the absolute difference between the 3-digit industry code of the district-industry cell 
and the 3-digit industry code of the privatized firm in that district. Privatization  is a multi-valued treatment variable that 
counts the number of privatizations events in a district up to and including the current year.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Y Labor Y
Privatization 0.05 0.71 1.11 1.28*
(0.23) (0.46) (0.76) -0.68
Sample
Observations 342 342 565 565
Table 9.1. Labor and output reallocation, by labor regime rigidity
Pro-worker states Non pro-worker states
Notes: All regressions include district fixed effects, state x year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. Aggregate output and 
capital are measured in 10 billion rupees (base 1993); Employment is measured in units of 10,000 workers.  Standard errors are 
clustered at district level. Privatization is a multi-valued treatment variable that counts the number of privatizations events in a district 
up to and including the current year.
Dependent variable: Aggregate output (1) (2)
Privatization 0.330 1.318**
(0.580) (0.606)
Sample
Below-median 
productivity gap
Above-median 
productivity gap
Observations 364 407
Table 9.2. Aggregate output effects, by baseline productivity gap
Notes: All regressions include district fixed effects, state x year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. Aggregate 
output and capital are measured in 10 billion rupees (base 1993); Employment is measured in units of 10,000 workers.  
Standard errors are clustered at district level. Privatization is a multi-valued treatment variable that counts the number of 
privatizations events in a district up to and including the current year.
(1) (2) (3)
Aggregate 
productivity
Average 
productivity Covariance
Privatization 0.075** -0.007 0.082***
(0.036) (0.021) (0.029)
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128
(1) (2) (3)
Covariance
Within-sector 
covariance
Between sector 
covariance
Privatization 0.082*** -0.092 0.174
(0.029) (0.165) (0.153)
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128
Table 10. Olley-Pakes decomposition of aggregate productivity
Table 11. Within and between-sector reallocation
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district level. All regressions include district fixed effects, state 
x year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. Privatization  is a multi-valued treatment variable that 
counts the number of privatizations events in a district up to and including the current year.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district level. All regressions include district fixed effects, state 
x year fixed effects and district-specific linear trends. Privatization  is a multi-valued treatment variable that 
counts the number of privatizations events in a district up to and including the current year.
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